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Military and Paramilitary Activities In and
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States): The International Court of
Justice's Jurisdictional Dilemma
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1984, the United States entered Nicaraguan territorial waters
and mined its harbors.' Nicaragua, angered by this and other inter-
vention2 by the United States, sought international judicial relief by
filing a complaint against the United States with the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague, the Netherlands. 3 The United
States challenged Nicaragua's complaint by arguing that the ICJ
lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.4
In the ensuing months, the United States charged the ICJ with
involvement in political disputes that were outside of its statutory
purview. Nicaragua, on the other hand, claimed the United States'
charges were "a direct assault on the international legal order." 5
Although the ICJ ultimately decided that it had jurisdiction, the
1. The mining operations in Nicaragua were backed by the CIA. The Reagan Adminis-
tration justified the covert operations by arguing that the Communist government in Nicara-
gua, the Sandinistas, were exporting terrorism and violence into Central America. N.Y.
Times, Apr. 12, 1984, at A1, col. 6 & A12, col. 1. Proponents of the CIA action specifically
pointed to the Nicaraguan government's support of leftist guerillas in El Salvador. The mining
of the harbors was justified, they said, as a form of self-defense for El Salvador and its allies.
Id Apr. 10, 1984, at Al, col. 6. A white House statement said: "[Tlhere is no doubt that the
Soviet Union and Cuba want to see Communism spread further in Central America." Id Apr.
12, 1984, at A12, col. 2.
Congress was not persuaded. Feeling the covert activities were beyond the scope of the
Administration's power, an outcry was heard from the House and Senate. Funds to support
the mining were cut off. Id Apr. 11 & 12, 1984, at A1, col. 6.
Additionally, the Soviet Union made a formal protest to the United States claiming a
Soviet tanker had been damaged. Britian and France objected to the mining on the grounds
that it interfered with international shipping. Id Apr. 9, 1984, at Al col. 3.
2. In addition to the mining, the United States backed insurgents in Nicaragua, foes of
the Nicaraguan government. Rebels backed by the United States damaged Nicaraguan radio
stations during air missions. The Reagan Administration's goal in using military pressure was
to replace or modify the Sandinista government. Id. Apr. 11, 1984, at A8, cols. 4 & 5.
3. Communique of the International Court of Justice, 84/18, May 10, 1984 [hereinafter
cited as Communique 84/18].
4. Id.
5. N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1984, Al, col. 6.
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United States boycotted the court proceedings and stated it would not
abide by the ICJ's final decision.
6
This Note will focus upon the issue of whether or not the ICJ
was correct in determining that it had jurisdiction to hear the dispute
between the United States and Nicaragua. 7 One basis of ICJ jurisdic-
tion is Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the ICJ, known as the
Optional Clause. This clause gives the ICJ compulsory personal juris-
diction if all of the litigants before the ICJ have signed the clause8 and
if the dispute is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICJ.9 An-
other way the ICJ may obtain jurisdiction is through a treaty clause
between the two parties. 10 These two means of acquiring jurisdiction
will be examined by analyzing the ICJ's actual determination of juris-
diction and considering whether proper jurisdiction did exist in this
international dispute. Furthermore, because the ICJ indicated in-
terim measures in the case, before it determined it had jurisdiction on
the merits, 1 this Note will also focus upon the ancillary question of
whether the ICJ correctly imposed interim remedial measures.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
A. Facts
With a need for a forum to settle its dispute with the United
States, Nicaragua instituted proceedings at the ICJ on April 9, 1984.12
Nicaragua argued that the United States violated Nicaragua's sover-
eignty by using military force in Nicaragua and by meddling in Nica-
6. NEWSWEEK, Jan. 28, 1985, at 45.
7. The ICJ is the successor to the Permanent Court of International Justice. D.J. HAR-
RIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 707-08 (3d ed. 1983). Both of these
institutions are also referred to as the World Court. Id at 708. The Permanent Court was
established by the League of Nations in 1920 and in 1946 the United Nations replaced it with
the ICJ. Id The Statute of the International Court of Justice, which is part of the United
Nations Charter, is the framework under which the court functions. Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, art. 1. See also D.J. HARRIS, supra, at 708. The ICJ is headquartered
in the Hague, the Netherlands. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 22. The
justices of the ICJ are selected by the United Nations Security Council. There are 15 mem-
bers, each chosen from a country represented on the Security Council. D.J. HARRIS, supra, at
708.
8. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36, 1 2. For a discussion of this
section, see infra note 16.
9. Id For a discussion of subject matter jurisdiction under the Optional Clause, see
infra note 18.
10. Id. 1.
11. Communique 84/18, supra note 3, at 1.
12. Communique of the International Court of Justice, 84/10, Apr. 9, 1984 [hereinafter
cited as Communique 84/10].
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ragua's internal affairs. 13 Nicaragua supported its claim by citing the
United States' efforts to intimidate the Nicaraguan government by
mining its territorial waters and by participating in covert military
incursions into Nicaragua.14 Not only did Nicaragua request that the
ICJ adjudicate its claim against the United States, but it also re-
quested that the ICJ indicate provisional interim measures requiring
the United States to cease its covert and overt military operations
against the Sandinista regime of Nicaragua until the claim on the
merits was settled.15
Based on the Optional Clause, Nicaragua asserted that the ICJ
had compulsory jurisdiction to hear the dispute.' 6 Since both the
13. Id. The Reagan Administration countered Nicaragua's filing by saying it was an
attempt to divert attention from the real issue-bringing peace to the region. The Administra-
tion supported this allegation by pointing to Nicaragua's lack of support for the Cantadora
discussions. These discussions involved Panama, Columbia, Mexico, and Venuezuela. The
focus of the discussions was to end aggression and foreign military support in Central
America. The State Department said Nicaragua was diverting attention from its failure to
participate in the Cantadora proceedings by "staging propoganda spectaculars in other fora."
N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1984, at A4, col. 1. The State Department concluded that the United
States "serve[s] notice that [the United States does] not intend to cooperate with this plan or
permit the court to be misused in [this] manner." Id
14. See Communique 84/10, supra note 12. Nicaragua specifically alleged that the
United States violated general and customary international law by "armed attacks against Nic-
aragua by air, land, and sea;.. . aerial trespass into Nicaragua airspace; [and] efforts by direct
and indirect means to coerce and intimidate the Government of Nicaragua." Id at 2.
15. Id at 1. The preliminary measures that Nicaragua asked the ICJ to follow were:
That the United States should immediately cease and desist from providing, directly
or indirectly, any support. . . to any nation, group, organization, movement or indi-
vidual engaged or planning to engage in military. . . activities in or against Nicara-
gua. [And] the United States should immediately cease and desist from any military
• . .activity by its own officials, agents or forces in or against Nicaragua and from
any other use or threat of force in its relations with Nicaragua.
Id at 1. Nicaragua requested provisional measures because the urgency of the situation war-
ranted immediate relief. Nicaragua claimed it could not wait. Id
16. Communique 84/18, supra note 3, at 3, 4. Article 36, 2, of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice states that "[t]he states parties to the present Statute may at any
time declare that they recognize as compulsory. . . the jurisdiction of the Court .... In
other words, a state agreeing to compulsory jurisdiction may use the ICJ as a means to settle a
dispute of international origin that it has with any other state that has agreed to the compul-
sory jurisdiction of the ICJ. D.J. HARRIS, supra note 7, at 712. At the present time, 47 coun-
tries have ratified the Optional Clause. 1982-1983 I.C.J.Y.B. 56 (1983). Although $ 1 of
Article 36 states that all members to the United Nations are parties to the Statute of the ICJ,
individual nations must ratify the Optional Clause in order for them to invoke the Clause
against another state or have the Clause invoked against them by another state. See Treatment
in Hungary of Aircraft of the United States of America (U.S. v. Hung.), 1954 I.C.J. 99 (Order
of July 12) (ICJ refused to extend compulsory jurisdiction over Hungary merely because Hun-
gary was a United Nations member. The court held that compulsory jurisdiction would only
exist if Hungary had signed the Optional Clause). Three non-member nations, Switzerland,
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United States and Nicaragua had signed the Optional Clause, Nicara-
gua claimed that the first requirement of the Optional Clause, signa-
tures of both parties, was met.' 7 Nicaragua further argued that the
second requirement of the Optional Clause, subject matter jurisdic-
tion, was also satisfied because the United States violated certain mul-
tinational treaties and international law.
18
Alternatively, Nicaragua contended that if jurisdiction failed
under the Optional Clause, the ICJ had jurisdiction based upon the
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce & Navigation between the United
States and Nicaragua.19 Nicaragua argued the compromissory clause
in that treaty gave the ICJ jurisdiction to hear the dispute.
20
The United States asserted the ICJ lacked jurisdiction under the
Optional Clause.21 The United States contended that Nicaragua had
never formally signed the Optional Clause, precluding its use in this
case. 22 The United States also disputed that the ICJ had subject mat-
ter jurisdiction because of certain United States Optional Clause ex-
Liechtenstein, and San Marino, have signed the Optional Clause as allowed by Article 36, 1 2.
1982-1983 I.C.J.Y.B. 42.
17. Communique 84/18, supra note 3, at 4.
18. Communique 84/10, supra note 12, at 2. Although all parties to a dispute may have
signed the Optional Clause, the ICJ may still lack jurisdiction due to subject matter limita-
tions. Statute of the I.C.J., art. 6. Article 36, 2, lists four specific types of questions which
may be referred to the court by states parties:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an
international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an interna-
tional obligation.
19. Communique of the International Court of Justice, 84/39, Nov. 26, 1984, at 9 [here-
inafter cited as Communique 84/39].
20. Id There are other methods besides the Optional Clause to give the ICJ jurisdiction.
The most common method is through a compromissory clause in a multinational or bilateral
treaty. 1 ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRAcTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 333-34
(1965), quoted in D.J. HARRIS, supra note 7, at 713. Here, the parties agreed to submit dis-
putes to the ICJ that arise under the treaty. Id. See Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1973
I.C.J. 3, 14-15 (Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment) (ICJ using a compromissory clause to
seize jurisdiction). This case is discussed infra at note 49. The treaty may encompass many
subjects, but the parties may limit the number of treaty terms subject to the ICJ's jurisdiction.
1 RoSENNE, supra, at 333-34, quoted in D.J. HARRIS, supra note 7, at 713.
The ICJ can also acquire jurisdiction by special agreement. Id A special agreement en-
tails the reference of a dispute between two nations to the ICJ after the dispute has arisen. Id.
The states involved must accede to the court's jurisdiction or the ICJ will deny jurisdiction.
Id See also Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1948 I.C.J. 15 (Judgment on Preliminary
Objection) (parties agreed to the ICJ's jurisdiction after the dispute arose).
21. Communique 84/18, supra note 3, at 4.
22. Id
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ceptions for multinational treaties and Central American disputes.23
Lastly, although the United States did not pursue this argument
when the case was heard on the merits, it did indicate during the pre-
liminary phase of the case that the dispute was a matter of United
States domestic affairs. Therefore, it was outside the jurisdiciton of
the ICJ.24
B. The ICJ's Decision
With these arguments before it, the ICJ had to determine if it
had jurisdiction to impose interim remedial measures upon the United
States. Furthermore, it had to determine if it had jurisdiciton to adju-
dicate the case on the merits.
1. Interim measures
Article 41 of the Statute of the ICJ gives the court the authority
to provide interim measures if they are needed to protect the rights of
either party.25 The ICJ held that in this case, however, it should not
order interim measures unless Nicaragua was able to present a prima
facie basis upon which the jurisdiction of the court might be
founded.
26
Article 36, paragraph 6, of the Statute of the ICJ allows the court
to have the final word on whether it has jurisdiction over a particular
dispute regarding interim measures or a decision on the merits.
27
23. Communique 84/39, supra note 19, at 7, 8. States accepting the Optional Clause may
limit the ICJ's jurisdiction by reserving or excepting issues from the ICJ in its acceptance of
the Optional Clause. Statute of the ICJ, art. 36, $ 3. If a state does condition its acceptance of
the Optional Clause, other states who are parties to the Optional Clause have reciprocity of the
exception when facing the conditioning party before the ICJ. Id For an in-depth discussion
of various states' exceptions to the Optional Clause and the practical effect of such exceptions,
see generally Owen, Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice: A Study of
its Acceptance by Nations, 3 GA. L. REv. 704 (1969); Coquia, The Problem of Jurisdiction of
the International Court of Justice, 52 PHIL. L.J. 154, 156 (1977) (discussing problems with
such reservations).
24. See Communique 84/39, supra note 19, Annex (Schwebel, J., dissenting). Article 36,
2(a-d), would clearly exclude a state's internal matters.
25. Statute of the ICJ, art. 41, $ 1. Interim measures are similar to Rule 65 of the Fed. R.
Civ. P. Rule 65 allows a party to obtain a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining
order to prevent the adverse party from taking action that might hurt one of the litigants. The
order stays the parties' positions until the final outcome of the case is decided. Like a tempo-
rary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, ordering interim measures does not neces-
sarily implicate any party of wrongdoing. It simply preserves the rights of all parties until the
ICJ can adjudicate the claim on the merits.
26. See Communique 84/18, supra note 3.
27. Statute of the ICLJ art. 36, 6.
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Based upon the broad language of this Article, the ICJ determined
that Nicaragua's claim provided a sufficient jurisdictional basis for the
court to order interim measures.
28
To support its decision, the court ruled that it did not have "to
determine the validity or invalidity" of the United States' jurisdic-
tional argument to find a basis for provisional measures under the
Optional Clause.29 The ICJ further held that Nicaragua could rely on
the United States' 1946 acceptance of the Optional Clause as a basis
for compulsory jurisdiction when coupled with Nicaragua's accept-
ance.30 The court also held that for purposes of provisional measures
it did not have to determine whether or not the United States' mul-
tinational treaty or Central America exceptions excluded compulsory
jurisdiction.
31
The ICJ determined that the Optional Clauses, which were
agreed to by each party, "appear[ed] to afford a basis on which the
jurisdiction of the Court might be founded. '32 Nevertheless, the ICJ
held that when the case was presented on the merits, the United
States could argue the jurisdictional issue first, and at that time, the
ICJ would make a final decision as to whether it had jurisdiction. 33
Based upon this holding, the court used its power under Article 41 of
the Statute of the ICJ and ordered provisional measures.3 4
2. Final decision
On November 26, 1984, the ICJ determined it had jurisdiction to
adjudicate the case on the merits.35 Specifically, in a vote of eleven to
five, the ICJ found jurisdiction on the basis of Article 36, paragraphs
2 and 5 of the Statute of the ICJ.3 6 The court also held by a vote of
fourteen to two that it had jurisdiction to hear the claim "insofar as
[the claim] relates to a dispute concerning the interpretation . . . of
28. Communique 84/18, supra note 3, at 5.
29. Id
30. Id The United States' acceptance of the Optional Clause is not in dispute. Id
31. Id
32. Id
33. Id at 6. The ICJ emphasized that "its decision in no way prejudges the question of
its jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the case and leaves unaffected the right of the...
[United States' or Nicaraguan government] to submit arguments in respect of such jurisdiction
or such merits." Id.
34. Id In essence, the court ordered the United States to cease its military activities in
Nicaragua and ordered both parties to refrain from provoking one another until the ICJ could
settle the dispute on the merits. Id. at 1, 2.
35. Communique 84/39, supra note 19, at 1.
36. Id
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the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation. . . on the ba-
sis of Article XXIV of the Treaty. ' 37 Therefore, by a final vote of
fifteen to one, the ICJ conclusively determined Nicaragua presented
valid claims over which the ICJ had jurisdiction.
38
III. ANALYSIS
When determining jurisdiction in connection with interim meas-
ures, the ICJ held that it did not have to decide if it would ultimately
have jurisdiction on the merits.39 Nevertheless, the ICJ did have to
analyze the issue of jurisdiction fully before it could adjudicate the
claim on the merits. 4°
A. Jurisdiction for Interim Measures
Before the ICJ determined there was jurisdiction to hear the
case, the court determined that there was jurisdiction to order interim
measures.4 1 Whether the ICJ has the power to order provisional
measures before it determines whether it has jurisdiction to hear the
case, in general, has been in constant dispute. Although Article 41 of
the Statute of the ICJ provides for interim measures, it neither "speci-
fies. . . the stage of the proceedings at which the power to provide
for interim relief may be exercised, the considerations that should
guide the exercise of the power, nor the manner in which the power to
indicate interim measures may be implemented. ' 42 Despite the un-
certainty of Article 41, the ICJ is willing to provide interim measures
if the applicant makes a prima facie showing of jurisdiction even if
jurisdiction is contested by the respondent.
4 3
1. Standard to be imposed
In Anglo-Iranian Oil Company,4 Britain sought interim protec-
37. Id.
38. Id. at 2. The ICJ also unanimously held that if there were jurisdiction, then Nicara-
gua's application was admissible. Id.
39. Communique 84/18, supra note 3, at 5.
40. See Communique 84/39, supra note 19.
41. See supra text accompanying notes 25-34.
42. Note, International Law-The International Court of Justice Has Preliminary Juris-
diction to Indicate Interim Measures of Protection" The Nuclear Test Cases, 7 INT'L L. & POL.
163, 164 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 7 INT'L L. & POL.].
43. Goldsworthy, Interim Measures of Protection in the International Court of Justice, 68
AM. 3. INT'L L. 258, 260 (1974) (citing 1 ROSENNE, supra note 20, at 427) (argues that there
can be no proceedings until jurisdiction is proven).
44. (U.K. v. Iran), 1951 I.C.J. 89 (Order of July 5).
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tion from the ICJ after Iran breached a concession agreement by na-
tionalizing its oil fields.45 Iran, asserting the domestic jurisdiction
exception, claimed the ICJ had no jurisdiction to hear the case.46 A
majority of the court ordered interim measures, however, holding that
"it cannot be accepted a priori that a claim based on such a complaint
[breach of a concession agreement] falls completely outside the scope
of international jurisdiction.
'47
This has been dubbed the "possibility" test because "as long as
there is some possibility that the complaint would fall within the juris-
diction of the Court an indiction may be provided. ' 48 This test was
affirmed in Fisheries Jurisdiction,49 where the court held that interim
measures will be ordered if a showing by an applicant provides
"prima facie [facts as] . . . a possible basis on which the jurisdiction
of the Court might be founded." 50 Specifically, a majority in Fisheries
Jurisdiction found a possible basis for jurisdiction based on notes of
agreement exchanged between the parties warranting the imposition
of interim measures.
5 1
Nevertheless, certain justices on the ICJ were not satisfied with
the possibility test. In Anglo-Iranian Oil, they criticized the possibil-
ity test saying that, "[i]f there is no jurisdiction as to the merits, there
can be no jurisdiction to indicate interim measures of protection...
[.T]he Court ought not to indicate interim measures unless its compe-
tence. . . appears. . . to be reasonably probable."' 52  Thus, the pos-
sibility test was limited and a new standard emerged in Nuclear
Test.53
A majority of the court in Nuclear Test abandoned the words
45. Id
46. Id. at 2.
47. Id. at 93. See Merrills, interim Measures of Protection and the Substantive Jurisdic-
tion of the International Court, 36 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 86, 91 (1977).
48. Goldsworthy, supra note 43, at 262.
49. (U.K. v. Ice.), 1972 I.C.J. 12 (Interim Protection, Order of Aug. 17). There, Britain
was challenging Iceland's extension of territorial waters for fishing rights. Britain claimed that
notes exchanged between the two countries limited Iceland's fishing rights and any violation of
the agreement would be submitted to the ICJ. Id
50. Id at 16, quoted in Goldsworthy, supra note 43, at 262. In Fisheries Jurisdiction, the
majority held that the ICJ should not order interim measures "if the absence of jurisdiction on
the merits is manifest." 1972 I.C.J. 12, at 15.
51. Id at 17-18. See Mendelson, Interim Measures of Protection in Cases of Contested
Jurisdiction, 46 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 259, 282-84, 294-96 (1972-1973) (discussing opposition to
the majority's holding and the impact of the holding).
52. 1951 I.C.J. 89, 97 (Winiarski, J., & Badawi Pasha, J., dissenting). For a discussion of
the dissent, see Mendelson, supra note 51, at 280-81.
53. (Austl. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 99 (Interim Protection, Order of June 22).
[Vol. 7:379
Nicaragua v. United States
"possible basis" and held interim measures should not be indicated
unless the applicant makes a prima facie factual showing in order to
afford a basis upon which the jurisdiction of the court might be
founded. 54 A clear basis, rather than a possible basis, of jurisdiction
must now be shown. After a majority in Nuclear Test found a prima
facie showing of jurisdiction based on a multinational treaty between
the parties, the ICJ imposed interim measures.55
Nevertheless, there was still dissatisfaction among some mem-
bers of the ICJ with this narrower jurisdiction test.56 A dissent in
Nuclear Test states, "[tihe Court should above all have satisfied itself
that it really had jurisdiction, and not have contented itself with a
mere probablity."'57
Given the lack of a definite stand by the ICJ on the question of
jurisdiction in these cases, a new test, the current standard emerged.
This test is actually a combination of certain criteria in Anglo-Iranian
Oil and the standard in Nuclear Test. Rather than focus on the
strength of jurisdiction presented by the proponent, the ICJ now
looks at the purpose of interim measures. 58 In Anglo-Iranian Oil, the
majority stated that the object of interim measures is "to preserve the
respective rights of the Parties pending the decision of the Court." 59
One writer has therefore concluded "[tihe test is not whether ade-
quate compensation can ultimately be provided but whether 'irrepara-
ble' prejudice would be occasioned to the rights of the applicant if
interim protection is refused." 6 If the rights of the applicant are in
danger, the applicant need only demonstrate a prima facie claim of
54. 1973 I.C.J. 99, 102, quoted in Goldsworthy, supra note 43, at 262.
55. 1973 I.C.J. at 106. In Nuclear Test, applicants sought a prohibition against France
from conducting nuclear tests in the Pacific. Id
56. (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 135, 148 (Interim Protection, Order of June 22) (Forster, J.,
dissenting), 149-51 (Gros, J., dissenting) (decided same day as 1973 I.C.J. 99).
57. Id. (Forster, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). The dissenters found a primafacie
basis for jurisdiction in Fisheries Jurisdiction. D.J. HARRIs, supra note 7, at 735 n.2. For a
discussion of the Nuclear Test dissent, see Merrills, supra note 47, at 87-89, 95.
58. Goldsworthy, supra note 43, at 269-70. See D.J. HARRIS, supra note 7, at 733, where
he states:
The main problem which has arisen in respect of the Court's power to indicate in-
terim measures has been to identify the circumstances in which they can be indicated
before the Court's jurisdiction has been established to hear the merits of the case. The
difficulty has been to find a rule that properly takes account both of the fact that the
Court may ultimately decide that it lacks jurisdiction to hear the case and of the fact
that the parties' rights may be irreparably damaged before a decision as to jurisdic-
tion is taken. The Court's judgment weighs the second of these more heavily than
does the opinion of the two dissenting judges [in the Anglo-Iranian Oil case].
59. 1951 I.C.J. 89, 93, cited in Goldsworthy, supra note 43, at 268.
60. Goldsworthy, supra note 43, at 269.
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jurisdiction, which shifts "the burden of proof [that the ICJ has no
jurisdiction] on the party opposing the granting of interim meas-
ures. '61 Most commentators agree that the ICJ can indicate interim
measures before jurisdiction is decided on the merits. 62
2. Application of the standard
Applying these standards to the present case, the ICJ appeared
to be correct by imposing interim measures on the United States.
Nicaragua might have suffered irreparable damage had the ICJ not
ordered the United States to remove the mines from Nicaragua's
harbors because Nicaragua's commerce could have been severely af-
fected. Conversely, it appears that the United States was not dam-
aged by removing the mines. Thus, it seems that the "respective
rights of the parties pending the decision of the court" were preserved
through interim measures.
Furthermore, Nicaragua made a prima facie showing of jurisdic-
tion at the interim phase of the trial as required by Nuclear Test.
Since both the United States and Nicaragua had arguably accepted
and signed the Optional Clause, ostensibly there was a basis for juris-
diction as was found in Nuclear Test with the treaty and in Fisheries
Jurisdiction with the exchange of notes. Finally, since the signing of
the Optional Clause gives the court compulsory jurisdiction, jurisdic-
tion seems to be reasonably provable even under the stricter standard
enunciated by the Nuclear Test dissent.
Although the United States' Central America exception might
have obviated jurisdiction on the merits, a legal commentator has
stated:
[Tihe Court has jurisdiction to entertain a request for interim
measures on the basis of the finding that the subject of the dispute
falls within Article 36(2), regardless, at any stage, of any reserva-
tions. . . . [T]he Court need be concerned only with the formal
possibility of jurisdiction-whether the dispute fell within Article
36(2), regardless of any controversy surrounding the legality [of
61. 7 INT'L L. & POL., supra note 42, at 164. In The Interhandel, infra note 130 and
accompanying text, the ICJ rejected Switzerland's application for interim measures since no
damage would be done to Switzerland before a final determination on the merits was made.
(Switz. v. U.S.), 1957 I.C.J. 105, 111-12, cited in Mendelson, supra note 51, at 274-75.
62. Mendelson, supra note 51, 302-03 (discussing Hudson, The Thirtieth Year of the
World Court, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 22 (1952) (supporting the ICJ in Anglo-Iranian Oil for fear
that the dissenting position would seriously cripple the court). But see Mendelson, supra note
51, at 303-04 (discussing 1 ROSENNE, supra note 20, at 424 (finding interim measures are
inappropriate if an applicant contests jurisdiction)).
388 [Vol. 7:379
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reservations]. 63
Therefore, it appears irrelevant for the purposes of assessing the
propriety of interim measures that the United States excepted Central
America from its Optional Clause. Even though interim measures
were indicated, the United States could still argue the issue of jurisdic-
tion on the merits.64 Although a party may disregard interim meas-
ures because they are not binding in law,65 the United States indicated
that it had already removed the mines from Nicaragua's harbors.66
In summary, the ICJ acted within the bounds of its authority by
providing interim measures necessary to prevent irreparable harm to
Nicaragua by United States' actions. The Statute of the ICJ allows
such action by the court. Moreover, neither the rights of the United
States nor Nicaragua were harmed as a result of these interim
measures.
B. Jurisdiction on the Merits: Compulsory Jurisdiction under the
Optional Clause
Nicaragua offered two bases for jurisdiction: the Optional Clause
of the Statute of the ICJ and the compromissory clause of the United
States-Nicaragua Treaty of Friendship, Commerce & Navigation. To
prove that jurisdiction existed under the Optional Clause, Nicaragua
had to show that both it and the United States had signed the Op-
tional Clause.67 Alternatively, jurisdiction existed under the Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce & Navigation if Nicaragua showed that the
63. Goldsworthy, supra note 43, at 264-65. Judge Lauterpacht of the I, however, held
reservations to the Optional Clause must be treated as valid for the purpose of interim meas-
ures if such reservations would obviously exclude the ICJ's jurisdiction. Mendelson, supra
note 51, at 276-77 (quoting The Interhandel, 1957 I.C.J. 105, 118 (Lauterpacht,. J.,
concurring)).
64. Communique 84/18, supra note 3, at 6.
65. D.J. HARRIS, supra note 7, at 735. The respondents in Anglo-Iranian Oil, Fisheries
Jurisdiction, and Nuclear Test failed to comply with interim measures, as did Iran in Tehran,
infra note 180. Id But cf Goldsworthy, supra note 43, at 274 (arguing interim measures are
binding).
66. N.Y. Times, May 11, 1984, at A8, col. 1. Although the United States said that it
would abide by the court's interim measure decision, it also said that the decision is not incon-
sistent with the existing policy of the United States. One measure that the ICJ ordered was for
the United States to remove the mines from the Nicaraguan harbors. However, this had al-
ready been done after the covert mining became known to the public, partially due to the
outcry from Congress. The House was no longer financing the operation. See supra note 1.
Furthermore, the ICJ was not very explicit on how the United States should cease its military
operations in Nicaragua. N.Y. Times, supra, col. 1.
67. See supra notes 16 & 18.
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compromissory clause of that treaty gave the court jurisdiction.6s In
either instance, Nicaragua had to also show that the court had subject
matter jurisdiction, i.e., it was an international matter.
1. Personal and subject matter jurisdiction
For the ICJ to have jurisdiction over this dispute under the Op-
tional Clause, both the United States and Nicaragua must have signed
the Clause. 69 Nicaragua first had to prove that its acceptance of the
Optional Clause was valid.70 Nicaragua argued that it had accepted
the Optional Clause by its declaration before the Permanent Court of
International Justice in 1929.71 In support of this claim, Nicaragua
argued that any valid declaration of acceptance of the Optional
Clause before the Permanent Court was a valid acceptance under Ar-
ticle 36, paragraph 5, of the Statute of the ICJ,72 which provided that
any acceptance of the Optional Clause still in force under the rules of
the Permanent Court are still valid under the statute of the ICJ.73
On the other hand, the United States argued that the first re-
quirement of Article 36 was not met because Nicaragua never ratified
the Optional Clause.74 Since Nicaragua never actually ratified the
Protocol of Signature as required by the Permanent Court, the United
States contended that Nicaragua's signature was invalid. 75 Therefore,
it was not binding upon the ICJ because it was never in force.76
In rejecting the United States' argument, a majority of the ICJ
reasoned that, although Nicaragua had not ratified the Protocol of
Signature, Nicaragua's declaration was not necessarily void.77 Nica-
ragua could have cured the signature defect by depositing its instru-
68. See supra note 20.
69. Statute of the ICJ, art. 36, 2.
70. Communique 84/39, supra note 19, at 5-8.
71. Id. Countries that have accepted compulsory jurisdiction under the ICJ's predeces-
sor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, have been deemed to have accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ if their declarations are still considered valid. Statute of the
ICJ, art. 36, 5. See also supra note 7.
72. Communique 84/39, supra note 19, at 5-8.
73. Statute of the ICJ, art. 36, 5.
74. Communique 84/18, supra note 3, at 4.
75. Id.
76. Id The United States claim was correct: "According to a telegram dated 29 Novem-
ber 1939, addressed to the League of Nations, Nicaragua had ratified the Protocol of Signature
of the Permanent Court of International Justice. . . [and] the instrument of ratification was to
follow[; . . . the instrument of ratification was [never] received by the League of Nations."
1982-1983 I.C.J.Y.B. 79 n.l.
77. Communique 84/39, supra note 19, at 5-8.
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ment of ratification with the Permanent Court.78 Thus, a majority
agreed that Nicaragua's declaration had the "potential effect" of be-
coming valid for many years even though Nicaragua never ratified the
Protocol of Signature.79 Since the declaration was unconditional, the
majority further stated that it was valid for an unlimited period.80
The court then concluded:
[T]he Court takes the view that the primary concern of those who
drafted [the ICJ's] Statute was to maintain the greatest possible
continuity between [the ICJ] and the Permanent Court and that
their aim was to ensure . . . [the ICJ] should not result in a step
backwards in relation to the progress accomplished towards adopt-
ing a system of compulsory jurisdiction. . . . Nicaragua may
therefore be deemed to have given its consent to the transfer [of its
declaration into an effective one before the ICJ] when it signed and
ratified the [United Nations] Charter, thus accepting [compulsory
jurisdiction].
8 1
The majority's decision is consistent with past decisions of the
ICJ and Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ, which states that the ICJ
shall apply "judicial decisions" when adjudicating claims.8 2 In The
Interhandel,83 the court allowed Switzerland to invoke the Optional
Clause against the United States even though Switzerland signed the
Optional Clause after the dispute was filed.8 By analogy, Nicaragua
should be able to cure a similar defect in its Optional Clause even
though the dispute has already been filed.
Furthermore, relying on Interhandel and Right of Passage Over
78. Id
79. Id
80. Id at 6. The majority further supported its holding by stating that the words of
Article 36, $ 5, which made declarations, still in force under the Permanent Court effective
under the ICJ, denoted an intention of widening that paragraph's and that article's scope.
They concluded the English phrase in paragraph 5 which states "Declarations ... which are
still in force" does not expressly exclude a valid declaration which is not binding. The French
version of paragraph 5 would also support this conclusion according to the majority. Id
81. Id.
82. Statute of the ICJ, art. 38, l(d). However:
[J]udicial decisions of the International Court itself. . . are considered as a subsi-
dary means for the determination of the rules of international law. The judicial deci-
sions are considered on a subsidiary source . . . because, in accordance with the
Continental system of civil law, they have no binding force except between the par-
ties and in respect of that particular case.
Rankin, Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and the Rule of Law, 32 N.Y. ST. B.
BULL. 257, 267 (1960) (citing Statute of the ICJ, art. 59).
83. (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 I.C.J. 6 (Judgment of Mar. 21). See infra note 130 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of The Interhandel.
84. Id. at 23.
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Indian Territory,8 5 in which the ICJ rejected an opportunity to nullify
a defective Optional Clause claim of jurisdiction, commentators have
concluded that rather than strictly follow procedural rules and cripple
the operation of compulsory jurisdiction,8 6 the ICJ is more willing to
assert jurisdiction.
In the Nicaragua case, however, Judge Sir Robert Jennings of the
ICJ, agreeing with the United States, stated in a dissent that Nicara-
gua's declaration cannot be "still in force" as required by Article 36,
paragraph 5, because the declaration was never in force.87 Judge
Schwebel of the ICJ further stated that the plain meaning of para-
graph 5 supports the United States' argument because the drafting
history of paragraph 5 defines "still in force" as declarations that have
bound states to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court.
88
Given that this binding effect is achieved only by actually ratifying the
Optional Clause, Judge Schwebel argued that the ICJ lacked jurisdic-
tion because Nicaragua did not ratify the Protocol of Signature.8
9
The dissent's reasoning, however, ignores Interhandel. There-
fore, in accordance with equitable principles, the ICJ should allow
Nicaragua to sign the Optional Clause even if it is done after the filing
of the dispute. Consequently, the ICJ correctly held that Nicaragua
had indeed accepted the Optional Clause.
Even if the majority is correct in its determination that Nicara-
gua had ratified the Optional Clause, Article 36, paragraph 2, also
requires subject matter jurisdiction if compulsory jurisdiction is to
exist.9o
Nicaragua argued that subject matter jurisdiction existed because
the United States' military intervention into Nicaragua violated obli-
gations under four multinational treaties:
85. (Port. v. India), 1957 I.C.J. 125 (Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Nov. 26). See
infra note 120 for a discussion of the case.
86. See, e.g., Briggs, Interhande The Court's Judgment of March 21, 1959, on the Pre-
liminary Objections of the United States, 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 547, 554 (1959).
87. Communique 84/39, supra note 19, Annex at 4.
88. Id. But see note 80.
89. Communique 84/39, supra note 19, Annex at 4. The majority also reasoned that
because the ICJ yearbook listed Nicaragua as a signatory for the last 40 years, Nicaragua's
declaration was valid. The majority reasoned Article 38, 1 (d) of the Statute of the ICJ allows
the court to use "highly qualified publicists" to support its decision. Id. at 6. However, the
dissent argued the yearbook was not the work of a highly qualified publicist. Therefore, it was
wrong in principle to use the yearbook as a means to support jurisdiction. Id Annex at 5
(Schwebel, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the dissent also points out that the yearbook con-
tained a warning that Nicaragua's acceptance may be invalid. Id. See supra note 76.
90. See supra note 18.
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(1) Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter;
(2) Articles 18 & 20 of the Charter of the Organization of Ameri-
can States;
(3) Article 8 of the Convention on Rights and Duties of States;
(4) Article 1, Third, of the Convention Concerning the Duties and
Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife. 91
Normally, the violation of multinational treaties would give the
ICJ unequivocal subject matter jurisdiction.92 However, parties who
have signed the Optional Clause can except certain issues from the
ICJ's jurisdiction. 93 The United States has three such exceptions to
its Optional Clause: a multinational treaty exception, a Central
America exception, and a domestic law exception.
94
2. Multinational treaty exception
The United States contended that the terms of the Optional
Clause limited the ICJ's subject matter jurisdiction to disputes over
multinational treaties only when all parties to the disputed multina-
tional treaty were before the court.95 Because all of the parties to the
four disputed treaties were not before the court, the United States
argued that there was no jurisdiction.
96
A majority rejected this argument reasoning that, although the
United States correctly argued the other parties to the treaties could
be affected by the court's holding, these other "parties" could inter-
vene if they so desired.97 Therefore, a majority stated that those par-
ties "are not defenceless [sic] against any consequences that may arise
out of adjudication by the Court."98 Furthermore, although other
parties may be affected by the court's decision, the court held that this
would not deny the ICJ subject, matter jurisdiction in the present dis-
pute.99 Lastly, the majority rejected the multinational treaty argu-
ment apparently because the other treaty parties were not easily
91. Communique 84/10, supra note 12.
92. Statute of the ICJ, art. 36, 2(a).
93. Id. 3. See also Owen, supra note 23.
94. See infra text accompanying notes 95-166.
95. Communique 84/39, supra note 19, at 8. Clause c of the Optional Clause of the
United States also states that the United States may waive this requirement. 1982-1983
I.C.J.Y.B. 88-89.
96. Communique 84/39, supra note 19, at 8. Other Central American countries were
parties to the multinational treaties in question. Id.
97. Id. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(g) (similar rule in the United States federal courts).
98. Communique 84/39, supra note 19, at 8.
99. Id.
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identifiable. 00
In dissent, Judge Schwebel argued that the majority's decision
rejects the rules of the ICJ which allows such exceptions. 101 As for-
mer Judge Lauterpacht of the ICJ stated:
In accepting the jurisdiction of the Court Governments are free to
limit its jurisdiction in a drastic manner. As a result there may be
little left in the Acceptance which is subject to the jurisdiction of
the Court. This the Governments . . . are fully entitled to do. 102
By determining that other countries are free to intervene in a dispute
before the ICJ, the majority avoided commenting on the latitude a
government has to exclude issues as described by Judge Lauterpacht.
Additionally, the dissent rejected the majority's claim that other
parties to the treaties were not identifiable.103 The dissent found the
other treaty parties could easily be identified and thus the case should
not proceed without them.1°4 Therefore, the majority erred in failing
to recognize the United States' multinational treaty exception, an ex-
ception within a government's right and granted by the Statute of the
ICJ. 105
3. The Central America exception
Next, the United States relied upon a more recent exception it
had made to the Optional Clause. Anticipating Nicaragua's com-
plaint, the United States, pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 3, of the
Statute of the ICJ, excluded Central America from the ICJ's jurisdic-
tion on April 6, 1984.106 The majority, however, held this exclusion
inapplicable in the Nicaragua case,107 but also held that if the exclu-
sion was valid, the ICJ would lack jurisdiction to hear the dispute.108
In reaching this conclusion, the majority relied upon the United
States' declaration of acceptance of the Optional Clause in 1946
which states in part that the declaration is valid "until the expiration
100. Id. at Annex 5 (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
101. Id.
102. Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9, 46 (Judgment of July 6) (Lau-
terpacht, J., concurring). See infra notes 156-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Norwegian Loans.
103. Communique 84/39, supra note 19, Annex 5 (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
104. Id.
105. See supra text accompanying note 102.
106. Section Council Acts on Nicaraguan Case Before the World Court, 1984 A.B.A. SEC.
INT'L. L & PRAc. 13, No. 3, 1.
107. Communique 84/39, supra note 19, at 7.
108. Id
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of six months after notice may be given to terminate this resolu-
tion."109 The majority argued that the United States, by its own
choice, amended its Optional Clause to require six-month notification
before termination.110 Had the United States not so conditioned its
declaration, the majority reasoned that the United States could have
terminated it at any time.I 1  Instead, the United States chose notifica-
tion before termination and thus was not free to disregard its own
provisions." 2 A majority then concluded that the Central America
exclusion was invalid and inoperative as to this case," 3 because the
Central America exclusion had not been in force for six months prior
to Nicaragua's complaint." 4
Judge Jennings in a dissent argued that the Central America ex-
ception was valid because "the recent practice [of the court] shows
that States have the right to withdraw or alter their optional clause
declaration with immediate effect." 1 5 Furthermore, Judge Oda of the
ICJ and Judge Schwebel argued that the Central America exclusion
was valid because of the rule of reciprocity: if Nicaragua had ac-
cepted the Optional Clause, it did so without a provision requiring a
six-month notification to terminate." 6 Nicaragua could, therefore,
terminate or modify its Optional Clause at any time with immediate
effect." 7 Under the rule of reciprocity, the United States could in-
voke the terms of Nicaragua's Optional Clause against Nicaragua." 8
Therefore, Judges Oda and Schwebel concluded that the United
States' Central America exception had an immediate effect against
109. 1982-1983 I.C.J.Y.B. 89 (emphasis added).
110. Communique 84/39, supra note 19, at 4.
111. Id. at 7.
112. Id. at 8.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. Annex at 4 (Jennings, J., concurring and dissenting).
116. Id. Annex at 3 (Oda, J., concurring and dissenting), Annex at 5 (Schwebel, J.,
dissenting).
117. Id.
118. Id. See supra note 23 for the rule on reciprocity. A majority rejected this argument,
arguing that the rule of reciprocity is:
concerned with the scope and substance of the commitments entered into, including
reservations, and not with the formal conditions at their creation, duration or extinc-
tion. Reciprocity cannot be invoked in order to excuse departure from the terms of a
State's own declaration. . . . Nicaragua can invoke the six months' notice against
[the] United States. . . because it is an undertaking which is an integral part of the
instrument that contains it.
Id. at 8.
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Nicaragua. 119
The holding of the dissent is closer to the rule established by the
ICJ. In Right of Passage Over Indian Territory,120 India argued it
could invoke an exception in Portugal's Optional Clause to deny the
ICJ jurisdiction over their dispute.1 21 India claimed that the excep-
tion gave Portugal the right to withdraw a dispute before the ICJ im-
mediately upon notification, 122 as well as after it had been filed.123
The court rejected this argument, however, holding that Portu-
gal's reservation was not retroactively applicable, but effective only to
disputes brought before the ICJ after notification. 24 The court fur-
ther held that "[ilt is a rule of law generally accepted . . . that, once
the Court has been validly seised [sic] of a dispute, unilateral action
by the respondent State in terminating its Declaration . . . cannot
divest the Court of jurisdiction."1 25 The ICJ relied upon this lan-
guage and its earlier holding in Nottenbohm, 26 stating: "An extrinsic
fact, such as the subsequent lapse of the Declaration, by reason of the
expiry of the period or by denunciation, cannot deprive the court of
the jurisdiction already established."' 127 This holding clearly estab-
lished the rule that the ICJ will look to the date of the party's notifica-
tion of withdrawal to the ICJ as the effective date that the exception
will take effect.' 28 Since Portugal filed the dispute with the ICJ before
119. Id. Annex at 3 (Oda, J., concurring and dissenting), Annex at 5 (Schwebel, J.,
dissenting).
120. (Port. v. India), 1957 I.C.J. 125 (Preliminary Ojections, Judgment of Nov. 26).
121. Id. at 141-42. In that case, Portugal was trying to secure a right-of-way over Indian
territory to a Portugese enclave totally surrounded by India. Id.
122. Id. at 142.
123. Id. The third clause of the Portugese declaration provides that the "Portugese Gov-
ernment reserves the right to exclude from the scope of [its] declaration [of compulsory juris-
diction]. . . any given category or catagories of disputes. . . with effect from the moment of
such declaration." Id. at 141.
124. 1957 I.C.J. 125, 142. See also supra note 23 on how India could invoke the Portugese
reservation.
125. Id. at 142. See Lauterpacht, International Court of Justice: Case Concerning Rights
of Passage Over Indian Territory, 7 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 593, 597-98 (1958) (discussing
whether the ICJ should have invalidated India's claim and what effects the decision will have
on India's Optional Clause).
126. (Liechtenstein v. Guat.), 1953 I.C.J. 123 (Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Nov.
18) (emphasis added). "IT]he declaration of the respondent government, Guatemala, expired
in a month or so after the applicant government, Liechtenstein, had seized the Court. Seizen
of the Court is the formal institution of proceedings before it." D.J. HARRIS, supra note 7, at
22 n.83 (quoting 1953 I.C.J. 123).
127. 1957 I.C.J. 125, 142 (quoting 1953 I.C.J. 123).
128. Briggs, supra note 86, at 584.
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India requested withdrawal, India's withdrawal was ineffective. 129
In Interhandel,130 the court was faced with a dispute between
Switzerland and the United States that raised similar issues. Switzer-
land accepted the Optional Clause on July 28, 1948.131 This was after
Switzerland's dispute with the United States arose. 32 The United
States' Optional Clause restricts the ICJ's jurisdiction to disputes filed
after the United States accepted the Optional. Clause.133 Therefore,
under the rule of reciprocity, the United States argued that since Swit-
zerland could invoke the United States' reservation against the United
States to disputes filed after the United States accepted the Optional
Clause, the United States could invoke its own reservation against
Switzerland. 134 Switzerland, however, unlike the United States, did
not limit its Optional Clause to disputes filed after Switzerland's ac-
ceptance date. 3
5
The court held that the United States could not rely "upon a
restriction which. . . Switzerland has not included in its own Decla-
ration."' 36 Thus, the United States could not invoke a rule in its own
Optional Clause that would be inoperative unless Switzerland invoked
it. "[T]he Court sweeps away the. . . United States['] Objection...
[that] if accepted by the Court, would seriously have crippled the op-
eration of the system of compulsory jurisdiction." 37
In both Passage and Nottenbohm, notification of withdrawal was
subsequent to the date the dispute was filed and withdrawal was
therefore ineffective. 38 By analogy, the United States' exception ap-
pears to be effective, as the dissent argued, because it came prior to
the filing of the dispute with Nicaragua. Although the United States
had a six-month notification requirement, Nicaragua did not. Thus,
129. Id.
130. (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 I.C.J. 6 (Judgment of Mar. 21). Switzerland was seeking resti-
tution against the United States for Swiss assets taken by the United States Government during
World War II. The United States argued that the assets of the Swiss company, Interhandel,
which were located in the United States during the war were primarily German owned. Since
Germany was an enemy at the time, seizure was justified. Id. at 20.
131. 1982-1983 I.C.J.Y.B. 42.
132. 1959 I.C.J. 6, 22-23 (emphasis added).
133. 1982-1983 I.C.J.Y.B. 88-89.
134. 1959 I.C.J. 6, 22-23. See supra note 23 for the rule of reciprocity.
135. Id. The United States' acceptance of the Optional Clause in 1946 excluded disputes
prior to the United States' acceptance. 1982-1983 I.C.J.Y.B. 88-89.
136. 1959 I.C.J. at 23.
137. Briggs, supra note 86, at 554.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 120-27.
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the rule of reciprocity should have been applied. 39
Unlike Interhandel, the United States did not attempt to invoke
an inoperative exception in its own Optional Clause against Nicara-
gua. Rather, it invoked the terms of Nicaragua's Optional Clause
against Nicaragua which is clearly allowable under the rule of reci-
procity. 140 Works of leading commentators and past decisions of the
court would support the United States' argument. 41 The majority
was therefore incorrect in holding that the United States' Central
America exception was invalid.
Nevertheless, policy reasons might dictate that the United States
should not be able to except controversial issues. The United States
should not review its acceptance of the Optional Clause "on an ad hoc
basis after a live issue has arisen and the jurisdiction of the Court is
about to be invoked against the United States."' 142 The Central
America exception was:
unwarranted under the circumstances and in conflict with what
has been the consistent commitment of the United States to sup-
port the role of the ICJ .... [T]he United States cannot unilater-
ally select the cases it will permit the ICJ to consider against it
without undermining the effectiveness of the ICJ as a forum for the
potential resolution of international disputes.. . . [In the future
the United States Government [should] refrain from unnecessarily
diminishing United States acceptance of the jurisdiction of the In-
ternational Court of Justice. 14
3
If every country were allowed to behave as the United States did
in making exceptions in response to critical issues, the ICJ would be
emasculated. As stated above, however, the United States made its
Central America exception within legal parameters. Although the
policy reasons against the United States' action are strong, the ICJ
should have recognized this exception's legality, thus ensuring the
ICJ's credibility as a neutral tribunal.
139. Communique 84/39, supra note 19, Annex at 3 (Oda, J., dissenting), Annex at 5
(Schwebel, J., dissenting).
140. See supra note 23 for the rule of reciprocity. See also Certain Norwegian Loans, infra
text accompanying notes 156-58 for an effective use of reciprocity.
141. See supra text accompanying note 102. See also Briggs, supra note 84; and Merrills,
supra note 47.
142. Section Council Acts, supra note 106, at 2.
143. Id. at 1-2.
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4. The domestic law exclusion
The United States did not explicitly argue that the dispute fell
within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States, but it did allude
to such jurisdiction in the preliminary phase of the case.'" The
United States did not pursue this argument. Article 2, paragraph 7,
of the United Nations Charter provides that nothing shall authorize
the United Nations "to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Mem-
bers to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter."
The Statute of the ICJ is part of the United Nations Charter. 145 Addi-
tionally, the United States made an exception to its Optional
Clause, 146 known as Provision B. Provision B states compulsory ju-
risdiction will not be extended to the ICJ in disputes "essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States . . .as deter-
mined by the United States of America."1 47 Such reservations are
known as self-judging reservations.1 48
a. domestic law argument only valid under optional clause
In United States Diplomatic & Consular Staff in Tehran,149 Iran
argued that its dispute with the United States over the detention of
diplomats was an internal matter for Iran.1 50 However, the ICJ found
jurisdiction based upon a treaty and not upon the Optional Clause.1 51
The Tehran case, however, is distinguishable from the Nicara-
gua-United States case. In Tehran, a treaty other than the Optional
Clause gave the ICJ jurisdiction to hear the case, thus bypassing any
internal argument exception. Although Nicaragua also based its
jurisdictional claim on the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce & Navi-
144. Communique 84/18, supra note 3, at Annex, where Judge Schwebel states:
The United States was accordingly justified invoking before the Court what it saw as
wrongful acts of Nicaragua against other Central American states not because it can
speak for Costa Rica, Honduras and El Salvador but because the alleged violation by
Nicaragua of their security is a violation of the United States.
Id.
145. Statute of the ICJ, art. 1.
146. 1982-1983 I.C.J.Y.B. 88-89.
147. Id. at 88 (emphasis added).
148. See infra text accompanying notes 156-58.
149. (U.S. v. Iran), 1979 I.C.J. 7 (Provisional Measures, Order of Dec. 15).
150. Id. Iran argued that: "the deep-rootedness and the essential character of the Islamic
revolution of Iran, a revolution of a whole oppressed nation against its oppressors and their
masters, any examination of the numerous repercussions thereof is a matter essentially and
directly within the national sovereignty of Iran." Id. at 11.
151. Id. at 13.
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gation, 152 the treaty is distinguishable from the treaty between the
United States and Iran because the United States was able to cite a
specific treaty provision which Iran had violated, something Nicara-
gua did not do.
153
b. self-judging internal law reservation held valid
The ICJ has had several opportunities in the past to consider
treaty reservations that allow countries to determine what is domestic
or internal law. 154 This reservation, in effect, allowed a country to
interpret and invoke the domestic law exception to the ICJ's jurisdic-
tion. 55 In Certain Norwegian Loans,156 the court was faced with a
reservation in France's Optional Clause similar to that of the United
States' reservation. 5 7 In that case, Norway invoked the French reser-
vation against France in a dispute between Norway and France before
the ICJ.158 Norway effectively removed the ICJ's jurisdiction by in-
voking France's domestic law exception against France itself. The
United States' self-judging reservation is similar to France's self-judg-
ing reservation in Certain Norwegian Loans, because these reserva-
tions enable a party to determine what is domestic jurisdiction and,
alternatively, what is international law.' 59
In Certain Norwegian Loans, a majority held that there was no
jurisdiction to hear the case because "Norway . . .is entitled to ex-
cept from compulsory jurisdiction of the Court disputes understood
by Norway to be essentially within its national jurisdiction." 60 In the
present case, it appears that the United States' reservation could have
been invoked. In Certain Norwegian Loans, however, the court did
152. See infra text accompanying notes 180-88 for a discussion of Tehran and the Treaty
of Friendship, Commerce & Navigation.
153. Id. See also Right of Passage Over Indian Territory, supra text accompanying notes
120-25, where India unsuccessfully argued that international law was invalid because the dis-
pute was over land and solely within Indian territory. 1957 I.C.J. 125, 149-50.
154. See infra text accompanying notes 155-68.
155. Id.
156. (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9 (Judgment of July 6). The case was brought by France on
behalf of French holders of Norwegian bonds. Id.
157. The French reservation states: "This declaration does not apply to differences relat-
ing to matters which are essentially within the national jurisdiction as understood by the
[French government]". Id at 21.
158. Id. Although Norway did not have such a reservation in its Optional Clause, if the
French reservation is valid, Norway may invoke it against France. Id. at 27. See supra note 23
for the rule on reciprocity.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 146-47.
160. 1957 I.C.J. 9, 24. See Jennings, Recent Cases on Automatic Reservations to the Op-
tional Clause, 7 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 349 (1958). See also Rankin, supra note 82, at 261.
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not consider the validity of the French reservation. Neither party in
that case challenged the reservation as being inconsistent with Article
36, section 6 of the Statute of the ICJ,1 61 which gives the ICJ the sole
power to determine its jurisdiction-a potential challenge that might
have arisen in the present dispute.
c. criticism of self-judging clauses
Aware of the criticism of such reservations, perhaps the United
States decided not to pursue the argument. In a strong dissent in Cer-
tain Norwegian Loans, Judge Lauterpacht stated that the French res-
ervation is invalid because it is:
not only contrary to one of the most fundamental principles of in-
ternational-and national-jurisprudence according to which it is
within the inherent power of a tribunal to interpret the text estab-
lishing its jurisdiction . . . [,i]t is also contrary to a clear specific
provision of the Statute of the Court [Article 36, section 6].162
Judge Lauterpacht's view is not without support from one com-
mentator, who considers that "[t]his limitation reserved the right to
the United States, rather than the court, to determine whether a mat-
ter fell within this country's domestic jurisdiction."' 163 "[T]o put it in
terms of contract law, it is an illusory acceptance of the Court's juris-
diction, since it leaves to one of the parties the right to determine the
extent and the very existence of its obligation."' 64
When a country, rather than a court, has the power to decide
whether a matter relates to its domestic jurisdiction, it may be diffi-
cult because of the political realities of life for even the most co-
operative government to concede jurisdiction. The result is that
controversies over which the court has jurisdiction can readily be
converted into controversies not within its jurisdiction. 165
161. 1957 I.C.J. at 27.
162. Id. at 44. See Mendelson, supra note 51, at 276.
163. Rogers, The United States' "Automatic" Reservations to Optional Clause Jurisdiction
of the ICJ, 7 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 758, 759 (1958). This article also states that excluding
domestic problems from the ICJ's jurisdiction was, of course, important to protect the "safe-
guards [of] national independence of a country and its internal affairs." Nevertheless, the
Statute of the ICJ contains such a limitation in Article 36, 6, so the United States' reservation
was unnecessary. The article was questioning the right of the United States to be the one to
determine what is or is not domestic law. Id at 759.
164. Stevenson, The Case for Withdrawal of the Self-Judging Reservation to the United
States' Acceptance of the Optional Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice,
32 N.Y. ST. B. BULL. 161, 161-62 (1960).
165. Rogers, supra note 163, at 760. The ICJ has not yet decided the scope of such self-
judging reservations. Rankin, supra note 82, at 263. The United States did invoke the reserva-
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Judge Lauterpacht stated:
The Court is the guardian of its Statute. It is not within its power
to abandon, in deference to a reservation made by a party, a func-
tion which by virtue of an express provision of the Statute is an
essential safeguard of its compulsory jurisdiction. This is so in par-
ticular view of the fact that the principle enshrined in Article 36(6)
of the Statute is declaratory of one of the most firmly established
principles of international arbital and judicial practice. That prin-
ciple is that, in the matter of its jurisdiction, an international tribu-
nal, and not the interested party, has the power of decision whether
the dispute before it is covered by the instrument creating its
jurisdiction. 166
tion in Interhandel, supra note 130, but the ICJ dismissed the case on other grounds, so the
validity of the reservation was not determined. 1959 I.C.J. 6, 29 (local remedies not exhausted
by Switzerland).
166. Stevenson, supra note 164, at 162 (quoting Lauterpacht, J., from Interhandel, supra
note 130 at 104). This opinion states that Judge Lauterpacht would not only have found the
self-judging reservation invalid, but also the entire Optional Clause accepting compulsory ju-
risdiction in which the reservation is contained. "[Tihe discussion of the reservation . . .
serves to point up. . . [that the reservation is] inconsistent with the spirit of the Statute." Id
See also Merrills, supra note 47 at 91 (discussing Judge Lauterpacht's dissent in Interhandel).
Another commentator looked into the legislative history of the United States self-judging
reservation. He states the Senate was asked to adopt this reservation because some feared the
ICJ might extend its jurisdiction to such domestic disputes as immigration and trade. Oppo-
nents to the reservation emphasized that the ICJ would not have jurisdiction over those issues
because there was no international law on immigration and trade. Therefore, "the anxiety
expressed respecting possible extension of the court's jurisdiction to such traditional domestic
matters . . . was wholly unfounded." Rogers, supra note 163, at 759-61. The resolution
should not have been adopted because "[t]he record of the International Court of Justice
makes it clear that this court of distinguished jurists has not engaged or attempted to engage in
usurpation of jurisdiction which does not belong to it." Id. See also Briggs, supra note 86, at
557-59.
Another commentator found that the United States' fears of the court's interference were
not well-founded. He pointed to Article 2, paragraph 7, of the United Nations Charter as
protecting such intervention. Furthermore, he felt other safeguards, such as excluding specific
subject matters, could be implemented to protect the United States' concerns. Rankin, supra
note 82, at 268, 270-73.
"It is to be hoped that [the United States] will never declare that an issue which another
party thereto seeks to adjudicate before the Court concerns a matter which is essentially within
the [United States'] domestic jurisdiction, unless evidence of the law of nations as revealed in
the acquiescence of States generally sustains its decision." Comment, The United States Ac-
cepts The Optional Clause, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 778, 780-81 (1946). Furthermore, "it is not
believed that the American Government would at any time be disposed to press for an inter-
pretation in the application [of this reservation] that would be contemptuous of prevailing
opinion." Id This article also states that the United States "thereby asserts the right unilater-
ally [by this reservation], and regardless of the differing view of any other party to a dispute, to
decide whether the issue is one [to be]. . . submit[ted] to the Court of International Justice."
Id. at 780.
Nicaragua v. United States
Had the United States invoked the self-judging reservation, it ap-
pears that the ICJ would have accepted Judge Lauterpacht's view and
found not only the reservation itself void, but also the United States'
entire Optional Clause invalid.167 If the ICJ found the United States'
Optional Clause invalid, the court could not have used compulsory
jurisdiction under the Optional Clause to attain jurisdiction in the
present case.
The United States would have been disappointed for two reasons.
First, the United States has already found it difficult to get other na-
tions to accept the Optional Clause, partially due to the self-judging
clause. Second, if the United States' Optional Clause was found inva-
lid, it could no longer invoke compulsory jurisdiction as a means to
settle disputes with other countries before the ICJ. Hence, the United
States "could suffer. . . a defeat by the very reservation with which it
has hoped to protect itself from interference in its domestic affairs."1 68
Therefore, the United States could have probably invoked the self-
judging reservation to deny the ICJ compulsory jurisdiction. How-
ever, it would not have been advantageous to do so because of the
effect on future relations with the ICJ.
2. Jurisdiction and the Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce & Navigation
Notwithstanding the United States' three exceptions to the Op-
tional Clause, the ICJ could have found another means to seize juris-
diction. Nicaragua's second basis for asserting jurisdiction was under
a compromissory clause in the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce &
Navigation between Nicaragua and the United States. 169 Article
XXIV, paragraph 2, of the treaty is a compromissory clause giving
the ICJ jurisdiction to hear disputes that arise under the treaty if the
parties cannot settle their differences through diplomacy.1 70 The
treaty provides that "[a]ny dispute between the Parties as to the inter-
pretation or application of the present Treaty, not satisfactorily ad-
167. See Briggs, supra note 86, at 559, where the author states that Judges Lauterpacht
and Spender of the ICJ would have found the United States' self-judging reservation incompat-
ible with the legal obligations of compulsory jurisdiction. They would have not only found the
reservation a nullity, but the entire Optional Clause containing it. Id See also Rankin, supra
note 82, at 263; Stevenson, supra note 164, at 162; and Judge Lauterpacht's dissent in Inter-
handel 1959 I.C.J. 9, 95.
168. Rankin, supra note 82, at 263.
169. Communique 84/39, supra note 19, at 9.
170. No. 5224, 367 U.N.T.S. 4 (1960).
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justed by diplomacy, shall be submitted to the International Court of
Justice."1 71 Thus, Nicaragua argued that if the compromissory clause
does give the ICJ jurisdiction, there is no need to prove compulsory
jurisdiction under Article 36, paragraph 2.172
The United States countered that the compromissory clause was
inapplicable. 173 The United States argued that the clause was only
applicable if a dispute or a violation arose under the treaty. 174 Be-
cause Nicaragua failed to show any violation of the Friendship, Com-
merce & Navigation Treaty, the clause was an ineffective means for
the ICJ to seize jurisdiction.75
A majority agreed with Nicaragua 176 and rejected the United
States' claim that Nicaragua must first assert a dispute arising under
the treaty for the compromissory clause to be effective.1
77
"In [the] view of the court, the fact that a state has not expressly
referred . . . to a particular [clause] as having been violated by the
conduct of [the] other state, does not debar that state from invoking a
compromissory clause in that treaty."' 78 Therefore, the majority
found that the treaty gave the ICJ jurisdiction.
79
A case on point is United States Diplomatic & Consular Staff in
Tehran. 80 There, American diplomats were taken as hostages. The
United States argued that Iran was responsible because the captors
were backed by the Iranian government.' 8 ' Iran argued that its dis-
pute with the United States was an internal matter. 8 2 This argument
was rejected by the court, but it was not rejected on the basis of reser-
vations to the Optional Clause because Iran was not a party to the
Optional Clause. 8 3
Instead, the court found jurisdiction rested on a treaty ratified by
171. Id. art. XXIV, T 2. See also Communique 84/39, supra note 19, at 9.
172. Communique 84/39, supra note 19, at 9.
173. Id. But see Comment, Alternative Reservation to the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice, 72 HARV. L. REv. 749, 757 (1959) (stating treaty interpreta-
tions would always be an international dispute; by analogy, the United States could not claim
the multinational treaties are part of internal law).






180. (U.S. v. Iran), 1979 I.C.J. 7 (Provisional Measures, Order of Dec. 15).
181. Id. at 18.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 13.
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both the United States and Iran.18 4 The treaty stated that "[d]isputes
arising out of the . . . application . . . of the . . . [treaty] shall lie
within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Jus-
tice." 185 The taking of diplomats as hostages directly violated the
treaty. Therefore, based upon the treaty, the ICJ held there was juris-
diction to hear the case.'8 6 The court further held that a dispute
which concerns the "detention of internationally protected persons,
and involves the interpretation or application of multilateral conven-
tions codifying the international law . . .is one by its very nature
[t]hat falls within international jurisdiction."' 187
Therefore, by analogy, if Nicaragua could rely on the Treaty of
Friendship rather than the Optional Clause for jurisdiction, the
United States' exceptions to the Optional Clause would not bar juris-
diction. In the Tehran case, however, the United States was able to
cite a direct treaty violation, thereby allowing the ICJ to assert juris-
diction under the compromissory clause. Fisheries Jurisdiction,18 an-
other case reaching the ICJ through a compromissory clause, is
another example where one party was able to point to a specific treaty
violation for the court to interpret. Nicaragua cannot point to a simi-
lar specific treaty violation.
Both Judges Ruda and Schwebel of the ICJ, agreeing with the
United States, stated that Nicaragua failed to prove the ICJ's jurisdic-
tion under the treaty because Nicaragua did not cite specific violations
of the treaty. 18 9 Judge Schwebel further felt Nicaragua was using the
treaty as an inapplicable means to obtain ICJ jurisdiction: "[T]his
purely commercial treaty has no plausible relationship to the charges
of aggression and intervention."190 These judges correctly relied upon
past decisions of the ICJ as Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ sug-
gests.1 91 These past decisions, Tehran and Fisheries, suggest that a
party, as a condition to jurisdiction, must first cite a specific treaty
violation before the ICJ will seize jurisdiction through a compromis-
184. Id Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 & 1963 and Article 1 of the
Two Protocols attached to these Conventions.
185. Id (quoting Article 1 of the Vienna Convention).
186. Id
187. Id at 16.
188. 1973 I.C.J. 3. See supra note 20 for a discussion of Fisheries Jurisdiction.
189. Communique 84/39, supra note 19, Annex at 2 (Ruda, J., concurring and dissenting)
& Annex at 5 (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
190. Id. Annex 5 (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
191. Statute of the ICJ, art. 38, l(d).
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sory clause. 192
Even some judges concurring with the majority were skeptical
about jurisdiction arising under the treaty. Judge Nagendra Singh
found that there was clearly jurisdiction under the treaty, but felt that
"Nicaragua will now have to spell out clearly and specifically the vio-
lations of the Treaty involving its interpretation and application when
the court proceeds to consider the merits of the case."1 93 Judge Oda,
in another concurring opinion, held "the scope of the case should be
strictly limited to any violation of a specific provision of that
Treaty." 94
Nevertheless, the concurring judges ignore the fact that the com-
promissory clause states "disputes arising under the treaty. 1 95 By
requiring Nicaragua to identify a treaty violation after the ICJ seized
jurisdiction will result in a dismissal of the case if Nicaragua fails to
do so. Rather than be faced with this time-consuming process, the
ICJ should have agreed with the dissent and required Nicaragua to
delineate a specific treaty violation in order to invoke jurisdiction.
Since Nicaragua did not do so, the majority erred by finding jurisdic-
tion under the compromissory clause.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the ICJ found the requisite jurisdiction to hear the dis-
pute between the United States and Nicaragua, it appears that it did
so erroneously. The United States' multinational treaty reservation in
its Optional Clause excluded compulsory jurisdiction. The Central
America exception also excluded compulsory jurisdiction by the rule
of reciprocity. Furthermore, the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce &
Navigation did not afford a basis of jurisdiction because Nicaragua
failed to cite a specific violation of that treaty. Therefore, it is irrele-
vant whether or not Nicaragua had signed the Optional Clause be-
cause subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.
It is ironic that the ICJ properly applied interim measures even
though jurisdiction to hear the case should have ultimately failed.
Therefore, in the future, interim measures should not be indicated un-
less it is clear that there will be jurisdiction on the merits.
Although the ICJ was incorrect in determining that it had juris-
192. See supra text accompanying notes 180-88.
193. Communique 84/39, supra note 19, Annex at 1 (Nagendra Singh, J., concurring).
194. Id Annex at 3 (Oda, J., concurring and dissenting).
195. See supra text accompanying note 171.
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diction, the United States should have abided by the decision of the
court. It would only create chaos if parties, rather than courts, deter-
mined the scope of a court's power. Such a result would only weaken
courts of law. European countries found the United States' challenge
to jurisdiction in the Nicaragua case simply a means to avoid the
law.196 Other countries might follow suit. To avoid this end, all
countries should leave the issue of jurisdiction to the courts.
197
A leading commentator has indicated that the United States
should accept the court's jurisdiction more readily:
We do not seek to dominate other nations but we do hope to lead
toward peace. Such leadership can only be effective by example
and persuasion . . . The United States cannot expect to be be-
lieved in its asserted desire for peace and a rule of law to govern
nations if it continues to adhere to positions which cripple the in-
fluence and opportunity of the court to make its contribution to the
rule of law . . . For us to have a special place in history worthy
of the position of leadership we now occupy, it is time that we led
the way and advanced along the road where justice under law, not
as determined by us, but by the courts will determine disputes be-
tween nations. 198
Laurence H. Tribe, Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law at
Harvard Law School, stated:
Government under law is no mere game that we can quit whenever
we don't like the rules. By stalking out of the World Court, the
Reagan Administration derailed progress toward a world in which
nations are governed by something other than the law of the jun-
gle. In treating the Constitution and the laws of the United States
with the same cavalier contempt, the President and his advisers do
even greater harm. 199
196. L.A. Times, Apr. 26, 1984, at Part I at 8, col. 6. The ICJ has no power to enforce its
decisions. This is left to the United Nations Security Council. Since the United States has a
veto on the council, it is doubtful that the decision will be enforced. Id
197. The United States has defended its argument that the ICJ has no jurisdiction as "the
lesser of two evils." The United States contended that it had to choose between releasing
sensitive CIA information to defend itself before the ICJ and allowing Nicaragua to divert
attention from the real issue, or showing disrespect toward the court. The United States chose
the latter. N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1984, col. 2. A former lawyer with the State Department
argued that withdrawal by the United States will be regarded as a concession of guilt. Id Apr.
10, 1984, at A4, col. 1. House Speaker Thomas (Tip) O'Neill said the American actions look
"legally indefensible." Id. Apr. 11, 1984, at A8, col. I & 2.
198. Rankin, supra note 82, at 272-73.
199. Tribe, We Are a Nation of Laws With a Scofflaw President, L.A. Times, Oct. 23, 1985,
at Part II, at 5, col. 1. Tribe also states:
The Constitution binds the President and his Administration just as surely as it binds
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The United States has subsequently withdrawn from the case
claiming that the ICJ's decision is merely political. 2°° It has indicated
that it would not abide by the ICJ's final decision because the United
States feels that the ICJ lacks jurisdiction.20 1 This result can only
undermine the effectiveness of the ICJ and the integrity of both the
ICJ and the United States, since the ICJ has no means to enforce its
decision.
Martin B. Howard
the rest of us. Balzac once described law as a spider web that snags trifling little flies,
but surely cannot hold a hawk. Even the most affable of Presidents should not be
allowed to make that cynical metaphor into his code of conduct.
200. NEWSWEEK, supra note 5, at 45.
201. Id. On October 7, 1985, the United States withdrew from World Court compulsory
jurisdiction. L.A. Times, Oct. 8, 1985, at Part I, at 1, col. 5. The State Department called it "a
noble but unsuccessful 39-year 'experiment' in international law." Id. at col. 5. The United
States made this decision as a direct result of the Nicaragua dispute. Id. Only 45 nations now
accept compulsory jurisdiction. Id. at col. 6. Responding to the withdrawal of compulsory
jurisdiction, Tribe stated:
There is an old riddle that asks, 'What does an 800-pound gorilla do for fun?' The
answer, of course, is 'anything he wants.' The United States government is far more
powerful than the gorilla, but there is nothing amusing in the fact that the Reagan
Administration behaves as if this were an appropriate standard of conduct. Both at
home and abroad, the Administration has made clear that it will not be inconve-
nienced by mere laws; it will do as it likes.
Tribe, supra note 199, at col. 1.
